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Third Circuit Review
TAKING A STAND ON STANDING: THE THIRD CIRCUIT WIDENS
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT BY NARROWING PRIVATE ANTITRUST
STANDING UNDER THE “CONSUMER-OR-COMPETITOR” TEST
ELIZABETH GIORDANO*
“Every violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise
system envisaged by Congress.  This system depends on strong
competition for its health and vigor, and strong competition depends,
in turn, on compliance with antitrust legislation.  In enacting these laws,
Congress had many means at its disposal to penalize violators. . . . [but]
Congress chose to permit all persons to sue to recover three times their
actual damages every time they were injured in their business or
property by an antitrust violation.”1
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ABOLISHMENT OF ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR VIA
ANTITRUST LAWS
One of the founding principles of the United States has been the
promotion of a strong, competitive market.2  To accomplish this goal,
Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act in 1890
and 1914, respectively.3  Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, private par-
ties who have been harmed by another’s anticompetitive behavior may sue
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University School of Law.  I would like to
thank my family for their unwavering support and express my gratitude to the
editors of the Villanova Law Review for their invaluable feedback during the writing
and editing process.
1. Hawaii v. Stand. Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (citation omitted).
2. See id. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN
ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS 9–18 (5th ed. 2014) (discussing how truly compet-
itive market will result in goods being produced at highest quality and lowest cost
possible, thus benefiting consumers).
3. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)); Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012)).  The Sherman Antitrust Act decrees,
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.”  Sherman Antitrust Act § 1.  The congressional intent of the
Sherman Act is shrouded with uncertainty because, at the time of its enactment,
members of Congress held differing opinions as to its necessity. See MORGAN, supra
note 2, at 25–28 (discussing various theories concerning congressional intent of
Sherman Act).  A significant number of congressmen, including Senator Sherman,
viewed the Sherman Act as an attempt to protect consumers. See id. at 26 (quoting
Congressman Sherman who stated that Sherman Act sought to “prevent . . . combi-
nations made with a view . . . to increase the profits of the producer at the cost of
the consumer” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
(703)
1
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for treble damages.4  Because the plain language of Section 4 states “any
person who shall be injured . . . shall recover,” seemingly the only qualifi-
cation imposed by the statute itself is that a party seeking recovery must
have actually been injured.5  However, the Supreme Court and the federal
appellate courts have read implicit limitations into Section 4, holding that
only certain injured parties have the proper standing to obtain
recompense.6
The road to determining which private parties have standing to bring
a claim pursuant to the Clayton Act has been fraught with uncertainty, as
the circuit courts have employed a variety of incongruous tests.7  Notably,
the Third Circuit has adopted a comparatively strict and relatively inflexi-
ble “consumer-or-competitor” standard for evaluating antitrust standing.8
Recently, the Third Circuit once again narrowed this already restrictive
standard in Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Laboratories,9 where the court
held that a manufacturer of a fenofibrate drug did not have standing to
bring suit against a dual manufacturer and distributor of a similar fe-
nofibrate drug.10  The decision is representative of the Third Circuit’s in-
flexible and constricted approach to standing issues and has further
widened the circuit split over the appropriate test for antitrust standing.11
4. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (emphasis added) (“[A]ny person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws may sue . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained . . . .”).
5. See id.  The right to privately enforce antitrust violations, which is provided
by the Clayton Act, is highly significant. See David Gregory Mayhan, Note, More
Trouble with Treble: The Effects of McCready and Associated General Contractors on
the Antitrust Standing Opinions of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 10 J. CORP. L. 463, 464
(1985) (explaining that in 1982, United States government filed 111 antitrust ac-
tions, while private parties filed 1,037 antitrust cases).
6. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) (explaining limit to
Clayton Act violator’s liability notwithstanding “broad” language of Section 4 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).  The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 4
of the Clayton Act to mean that the right to treble damages does not extend to
people “tangentially affected by an antitrust violation” in order to reduce the “risk
of duplicative recovery.” See id. at 474–77 (summarizing Supreme Court precedent
concerning boundaries of Section 4 standing).
7. For a discussion of the development of antitrust standing and the varying
tests that the Supreme Court and federal circuits have historically used, see infra
notes 22–41 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., C. Douglas Floyd, Antitrust Victims Without Antitrust Remedies: The
Narrowing of Standing in Private Antitrust Actions, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1997)
(describing consumer-or-competitor approach as much “too narrow” interpreta-
tion of standing).
9. 707 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2013) (Ethypharm III).
10. For a discussion on the Third Circuit’s most recent antitrust standing
analysis, see infra notes 64–93 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, SigmaPharm, Inc. v. Mut.
Pharm. Co., 454 F. App’x 64 (3d Cir. 2011) [hereinafter SigmaPharm Cert. Peti-
tion], 2012 WL 1419939, at *15, 23, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 110 (2012) (No. 11-1275)
(stating that there is “long standing” circuit split concerning antitrust standing, as
only Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have limited private antitrust standing to
2
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This Casebrief discusses both the development and inner-workings of
the Third Circuit’s consumer-or-competitor standing test and serves as a
guide to practitioners hoping to bring private party antitrust claims in the
Third Circuit.12  Part II discusses the development of differing antitrust
standing tests in the federal circuits and specifically focuses on the devel-
opment of the Third Circuit’s consumer-or-competitor test.13  Part III dis-
cusses the recent decision in Ethypharm and highlights how this decision
has made it more difficult to qualify as a competitor under the consumer-
or-competitor test.14  Part IV then addresses the potential impact of this
decision within the pharmaceutical industry.15  Part V gives guidance to
practitioners who wish to either bring private antitrust claims in the Third
Circuit or structure distributor relationships while still maintaining their
client’s Section 4 private right to action.16
Ultimately, this Casebrief emphasizes how the Third Circuit has aban-
doned its traditional definition of a “competitor” under the consumer-or-
competitor test in favor of a much more restrictive definition, thereby lim-
iting the number of potential private antitrust plaintiffs.17  Although the
Third Circuit asserted that its decision in Ethypharm was based on its tradi-
tional “competitor” analysis, this Casebrief argues the Third Circuit has
moved towards a stricter formulation of what constitutes a competitor and
aims to aid practitioners in light of this development.18
consumers or competitors); see also Marie L. Fiala et al., Third Circuit Applies “Con-
sumer-or-Competitor” Rule to Deny Antitrust Standing to Foreign Manufacturer of Drug
Marketed in U.S. by Licensee, ANTITRUST UPDATE (Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, Ill.),
Feb. 13, 2013, at 1, available at http://www.sidley.com/~/media/files/news/2013/
02/third-circuit-applies-consumerorcompetitor-rule-__/files/view-update-in-pdf-
format/fileattachment/antitrust-update-21313-as-of-2pm-final.pdf [http://perma
.cc/V7AC-JZPG] (asserting that decision in Ethypharm has “reinforced” Third Cir-
cuit’s consumer-or-competitor stance on antitrust standing).
12. See infra notes 19–118 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 19–41 and accompanying text (discussing development of
antitrust standing pursuant to Section 4 of Clayton Act in federal circuits gener-
ally); see also infra notes 42–63 and accompanying text (discussing development of
Section 4 standing and consumer-or-competitor test in Third Circuit).
14. See infra notes 64–93 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit’s
decision in Ethypharm).
15. For a discussion of how Ethypharm has essentially redefined who consti-
tutes a competitor under the consumer-or-competitor test, see infra notes 94–131.
For a discussion of the United States pharmaceutical industry’s unique distribution
chain and how the Third Circuit’s decision will disproportionately affect standing
in the pharmaceutical industry, see infra notes 132–45 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 132–45 and accompanying text (advising practitioners that
represent pharmaceutical manufacturers to structure their distribution chains as
“agency relationships” to maintain Section 4 standing).
17. See infra notes 94–131 and accompanying text (discussing impact of Third
Circuit’s altered definition of competitor on future antitrust litigation).
18. See infra notes 132–40 and accompanying text (discussing how practition-
ers can adapt their strategies in response to Third Circuit’s decision in Ethypharm).
3
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II. BACKGROUND: THE ADVANCEMENT OF ANTITRUST
STANDING IN FEDERAL COURTS
The substantial number of private antitrust claims brought each year
demonstrates the significance of standing under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act.19  Consequently, this Section offers a succinct overview of how the
Supreme Court has construed Section 4 thus far and how the federal cir-
cuits have subsequently interpreted these decisions.20  This Section also
specifically details the evolution of antitrust standing in the Third
Circuit.21
A. The Supreme Court’s Stance on Standing
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of private standing under the
Clayton Act in Blue Shield v. McCready22 and Associated General Contractors,
Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters23 in 1982 and 1983, respec-
tively.24  Prior to these decisions, the federal circuits had employed a num-
ber of different tests to determine whether a party had proper standing
pursuant to Section 4.25  In McCready, the Supreme Court held that a
“group health plan” subscriber had standing under the Clayton Act to
bring suit against a health insurer and a Virginia psychiatrist organiza-
19. See 2 SPENCER WEBER WALLER & ANDRE FIEBIG, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD § 13:19 (3d ed. 2014) (describing “major role” that private ac-
tions play in antitrust prosecution); Mayhan, supra note 5, at 464 (noting compara-
tively large number of private antitrust actions).
20. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s cases interpreting Section 4 of
the Clayton Act, see infra notes 22–31 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of
the federal circuits’ differing understandings of the Supreme Court’s cases con-
cerning standing, see infra notes 32–41 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 42–64 and accompanying text.
22. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
23. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
24. See Associated General, 459 U.S. at 521, 537–45 (setting out multifactor bal-
ancing test for determining standing under Section 4); McCready, 457 U.S. at 478
(setting out two-factor test for determining antitrust standing under Section 4).
25. See Mayhan, supra note 5, at 467–76 (explaining incongruous standing
tests that federal circuits had deployed prior to McCready and Associated General).
The prior tests included the “‘direct injury’ test, the ‘target area’ test, [ ] the ‘zone
of interests’ test[ ] [and the] ‘balancing’” test. See id. at 468 (footnotes omitted);
see also Daniel Berger & Roger Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Stand-
ing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 813–45 (1977) (discussing application of varying standing
tests in federal circuits); David L. Swider, Note, Standing to Sue in Private Antitrust
Litigation: Circuits in Conflict, 10 IND. L. REV. 532,  535–52 (1977) (tracing distinct
development of standing tests in every circuit). See generally Malamud v. Sinclair
Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151–52 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying zone of interests test,
which granted standing to plaintiffs who were in “zone of interests protected” by
antitrust acts); Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454
F.2d 1292, 1296 (2d Cir. 1971) (applying target area test, which granted standing
to plaintiffs who were in target area or were “target of any antitrust violation”);
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (applying direct injury
test, which granted standing to plaintiffs who could show that they were directly
injured by alleged antitrust violations).
4
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tion.26  In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that Sec-
tion 4 granted a non-restrictive approach to standing and explained,
“[t]he statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchas-
ers, or to competitors, or to sellers. . . .  Consistent with the congressional
purpose, we have refused to engraft artificial limitations on the § 4
remedy.”27
However, only one year later, the Supreme Court retreated from this
broad interpretation of Section 4 standing in Associated General.28  In deny-
ing standing to a labor union that sought damages from a contractor’s
association, the Supreme Court was quick to state that, despite the broad
language of Section 4, Congress intended the courts to “delineate” the
proper bounds of it.29  To determine if a party had standing, the Court
endorsed a multifactor-balancing test.30  Because the labor union was not
a consumer or competitor in the relevant marketplace, the Court noted
this weighed against the union’s standing claim.31
26. McCready, 457 U.S. at 477–78, 485, 489 (determining standing using two-
factor test that focused on (1) “nexus between the alleged violation and the harm”
suffered and (2) whether Congress intended for defendant’s conduct to be cov-
ered under Section 4).  The case concerned an employee of a Virginia county who,
pursuant to her employment contract, was provided with health coverage under
Blue Shield of Virginia. See id. at 467–68.  Under the plan, psychiatric treatment
for mental disorders was reimbursed, but psychological treatment was not. See id.
at 468.  Subsequently, the plaintiff brought a class action suit against Blue Shield,
claiming it had violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to “boycott clinical psychol-
ogists from receiving compensation under the Blue Shield plans.” See id. at 468–70
(internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id. at 472 (alterations in original) (quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc.
v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  The Supreme Court also relied on principles of statutory interpretation,
which call for statutes to be read in light of their “plain language” in the absence of
any contrary policy consideration. See id. at 473.
28. See Floyd, supra note 8, at 26–28 (discussing narrowing of private antitrust
standing under Associated General); Mayhan, supra note 5, at 476 (“It is clear that
Associated General Contractors has adopted a more restrictive test for granting anti-
trust standing than McCready.”); see also Robert P. Taylor, Antitrust Standing: Its
Growing—or More Accurately Its Shrinking—Dimensions, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 515,
519–22 (1986) (discussing Associated General’s significant restriction of Section 4
antitrust standing).
29. See Associated General, 459 U.S. at 531 (“One problem presented by the
language of § 1 of the Sherman Act is that it cannot mean what it says.” (quoting
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 (1978)) (internal
quotation mark omitted)); see also Nat Stern & Kevin B. Getzendanner, Gauging the
Impact of Associated General Contractors on Antitrust Standing Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 159, 176 (1986) (noting Associated General’s “re-
strictive” effect on private antitrust standing).
30. See Associated General, 459 U.S. at 536–46 (discussing relevant factors in
denying standing); Mayhan, supra note 5, at 473 (listing different factors Court
weighed).
31. See Associated General, 459 U.S. at 539 (explaining relevance that labor
union was “neither a consumer nor a competitor”).  The case involved a labor
union comprised of carpenters and a general contractor association. See id. at
521–23.  The labor union brought suit against the contractor association, alleging
5
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B. The Federal Circuits Stand Up: Interpreting McCready
and Associated General
Given the divergent standards set out in McCready and Associated Gen-
eral, the federal circuits have been unable to institute a uniform approach
to determine standing under Section 4.32  The Second Circuit initially in-
terpreted the balancing test in Associated General to be a mere complement
to the two-pronged McCready test and thus analyzed standing cases with a
primary focus on McCready.33  Notably, the Second Circuit declared that a
plaintiff may have Section 4 standing despite being neither a consumer
nor a competitor, because holding otherwise would be contrary to Associ-
ated General and McCready.34  The Tenth Circuit also explicitly endorsed
the view that pursuant to McCready, plaintiffs could have Section 4 stand-
ing even if they were not consumers or competitors in the relevant
marketplace.35
that the contractor association had violated antitrust laws by conspiring to deny the
labor union the ability to “enter into collective bargaining agreements” with other
contractors. See id. at 522 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, the
Court determined that the labor union “was neither a consumer nor a competitor
in the market in which trade was restrained” and therefore was “not a person in-
jured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws within the meaning of § 4 of the
Clayton Act.” See id. at 539, 546.
32. See Mayhan, supra note 5, at 478–82 (explaining how Supreme Court’s
decisions have engendered incongruent results in federal circuits).  One hypothe-
sis for the inconsistent results in the circuits is that although the two cases utilize
extremely different balancing tests, the Court in Associated General did not explicitly
overrule McCready. See id. at 474.  Nor did the Supreme Court explicitly state that
the Associated General’s test should be used in place of the federal circuits’ prior
standing tests, which led to some federal circuits creating fusion tests. See id. at
491.  The circuits have also chosen to “emphasize different factors” in the Supreme
Court’s balancing test, which has further promoted contrasting results. See id. at
479; see also Ronald W. Davis, Standing on Shaky Ground: The Strangely Elusive Doctrine
of Antitrust Injury, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 697, 699 (2003) (reviewing Supreme Court
and federal circuits’ antitrust standing tests and describing then-current state of
private antitrust actions); Kevin D. Gordon, Private Antitrust Standing: A Survey and
Analysis of the Law After Associated General, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 1069, 1072 (1984)
(describing tests that circuits have employed post McCready and Associated General).
33. See Crimpers Promotions Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290, 293,
293–97 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining that “Associated General indicates no departure
from McCready in any fashion pertinent to this case” and applying McCready test
first before addressing factors in Associated General); see also SigmaPharm Cert. Peti-
tion, supra note 11, at 15 (quoting Crimpers to illustrate problems associated with
circuit split on consumer-or-competitor test). But see Meijer, Inc. v. Ferring B.V.
(In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig.), 585 F.3d 677, 687–88 (2d Cir.
2009) (utilizing two-part standing test that favors many of factors from Associated
General).
34. See Crimpers, 724 F.2d at 297 (explaining lack of consumer-or-competitor
status should not bar Section 4 standing).
35. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 963 (10th Cir.
1990) (explaining Supreme Court held consumer-or-competitor status unneces-
sary for standing).
6
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Furthermore, in Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,36 the Fourth Circuit spe-
cifically denounced the practice of using the consumer-or-competitor test
as an absolute bar to antitrust standing.37  In Novell, a software company
brought suit against Microsoft for alleged antitrust violations, which in-
cluded an allegation that Microsoft had harmed competition in the oper-
ating systems market.38  In holding that the plaintiff had standing, the
Fourth Circuit stated that in Associated General, the Supreme Court had
disavowed a bright-line determinative approach.39  The Fourth Circuit
summarily concluded that a plaintiff’s status as a non-consumer and non-
competitor was a relevant but non-dispositive factor in addressing stand-
ing.40  However, other circuits, including the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Cir-
cuits, have interpreted Associated General as standing for the proposition
that an antitrust plaintiff must be a consumer or a competitor in the rele-
vant marketplace to have standing.41
C. Embracing the Consumer-or-Competitor Test: The Evolution of Standing in
the Third Circuit Post-McCready and Associated General
In 1997, the Third Circuit adopted the consumer-or-competitor test
in Schuylkill Energy Resources, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.42  The
36. 505 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2007).
37. See id. at 311 (rejecting defendant’s position that plaintiff must be con-
sumer-or-competitor to have standing and explaining that this “bright-line” rule
does not adhere to prior precedent); see also Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein,
Standing: Rejecting a ‘Consumer-or-Competitor’ Rule, 239 N.Y. L.J., Apr. 15, 2008, availa-
ble at http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Publications1388
_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/4NFH-WKK6] (explaining that Fourth Circuit in Novell
had declined to accept consumer-or-competitor rule as governing principle in
standing cases).
38. See Novell, 505 F.3d at 306–07 (describing facts of case); see also Stoll &
Goldfein, supra note 37 (describing fundamentals of case and claims brought
against defendant Microsoft).
39. See Novell, 505 F.3d at 310–13 (dismissing defendant’s argument that
plaintiff lacks standing simply because it is neither consumer nor competitor in PC
operating system market and predicating dismissal on Associated General decision).
40. See id. at 312–13 (holding that being consumer or competitor was not
“necessary prerequisite” to finding proper standing under Section 4).
41. See, e.g., Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 467 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding
plaintiff lacked standing pursuant to McCready because it was neither consumer
nor competitor); S.D. Collectibles, Inc. v. Plough, Inc., 952 F.2d 211, 213 (8th Cir.
1991) (same).  The Eighth Circuit has similarly interpreted Associated General to
mean standing is limited to “actual market participants, that is, competitors or
consumers.” See id. at 213.
42. 113 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 1997).  In adopting this bright-line rule, the Third
Circuit did not justify its reasoning under Associated General or McCready. See id.
(neglecting to reference McCready or Associated General in its opinion).  Instead, the
Third Circuit simply followed the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the
consumer-or-competitor standard. See id. at 415 (adopting standard announced in
Vinci v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 80 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1996)).  If a plaintiff is consid-
ered to be a competitor or a consumer, the Third Circuit will weigh the other
Associated General factors to determine if the plaintiff has standing.  City of Pitts-
burgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 1998).  Thus, under the
7
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definitions of competitor and the relevant marketplace were further re-
fined in Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.43 and Carpet
Group International v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass’n.44
In Barton & Pittinos, the Third Circuit addressed the definition of a
competitor within the consumer-or-competitor test by focusing on the
cross-elasticity of a company’s products.45  The plaintiff, a pharmaceutical
marketing company, entered into an agreement with the defendant, a
pharmaceutical company.46  Under the agreement, the plaintiff would
market and obtain orders of the defendant’s hepatitis B vaccine, and then
have a licensed medical supply house fill the orders.47  However, the de-
fendant-pharmaceutical company halted the agreement after pharmacists,
who had previously solicited and filled orders for the vaccine, com-
plained.48  The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for alleged an-
titrust violations, predicating standing on the fact that even though it was a
marketing company, it nonetheless functioned as the pharmacists’ com-
petitor in the pharmaceutical industry.49
The Third Circuit stated that to qualify as competitors in the relevant
marketplace, there must be cross-elasticity of demand, meaning the prod-
ucts in the market must be “reasonably interchangeable” goods.50  In
other words, companies were considered competitors if an increase in
product A’s prices caused consumers to buy product B.51  The court ulti-
Third Circuit’s view, consumer or competitor status is a prerequisite for Section 4
standing. See id.
43. 118 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1997) (defining competitor).
44. 227 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2000) (expanding on Barton & Pittinos court’s defini-
tion of competitor), overruled on other grounds by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir.), as amended (Oct. 7, 2011).
45. See Barton & Pittinos, 118 F.3d at 182 (comparing plaintiff’s product with
pharmacist’s product to determine if they were “reasonably interchangeable”).
46. See id. at 178–80 (stating facts of case).
47. Id. (same).
48. See id. (noting actions leading up to lawsuit).
49. See id. at 180–81 (discussing procedural posture of case).
50. See id. at 182–83 (defining relevant marketplace of defendant-pharma-
cist’s product in terms of cross-elasticity of demand and discussing cross-elasticity
of products); see also M. Howard Morse, Product Market Definition in the Pharmaceuti-
cal Industry, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 633, 657 (2003) (describing cases in pharmaceutical
industry that define relevant industry in terms of “reasonab[ly] interchangeability”
of products (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
51. See 1 JOHN J. MILES, HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW § 2:4 (2014) (refer-
encing all cases that have defined relevant product market and cross-elasticity in
terms of “substitutability” and using generic “product A” and “product B” to illus-
trate these points); see also Barton & Pittinos, 118 F.3d at 182–83 (analyzing whether
consumers would turn to plaintiff’s product if defendant’s offering increased in
price).
Delineating the relevant marketplace by cross-elasticity has been endorsed by
the Supreme Court and widely followed by the federal circuits. See, e.g., United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392–95 (1956) (stating
other wrapping producers were competitors with cellophane producers if consum-
8
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mately found there was no cross-elasticity of the plaintiff’s and the phar-
macists’ products.52  First, as a marketing company, the plaintiff did not
offer the same products or services as the pharmacists; the plaintiff’s prod-
uct was its marketing program for the defendant’s hepatitis vaccine, while
the pharmacy’s product was the drug itself.53  Second, the court also
found “no matter how much” the defendant’s vaccine prices rose, consum-
ers of the vaccine would not turn to the plaintiff’s marketing as a substi-
tute product.54  Thus, the court held that there was no cross-elasticity of
demand, and consequently the plaintiff was not a competitor within the
meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton Act.55
In Carpet Group, the Third Circuit employed the definition of competi-
tor it had first established in Barton & Pittinos.56  The plaintiff was a corpo-
ration formed with the intention of connecting United States rug retailers
with foreign rug manufacturers, thus cutting out the wholesaler-middle-
man.57  In response to this, a carpet wholesaler trade association initiated
group boycotts against manufacturers who did business with the plain-
tiff.58  The plaintiff subsequently brought suit against the trade association
for antitrust violations.59
The court decided the plaintiff was the defendant’s competitor be-
cause its product’s avenue of distribution was a reasonably interchangea-
ers would switch from cellophane to wrapping products in response to cellophane
prices increase); Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 496
(2d Cir. 2004) (holding Coumadin and generic warfarin did not compete with one
another because consumers would not switch to generic warfarin if Coumadin’s
prices rose); United Farmers Agents Ass’n v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 F.3d 233, 236
n.3 (5th Cir. 1996) (defining relevant market place by cross-elasticity of demand,
which measures consumers’ willingness to switch to product B if product A’s prices
rise (citing WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 343 (6th ed. 1979))).
52. See Barton & Pittinos, 118 F.3d at 182–83 (holding no cross-elasticity of
demand between plaintiff’s and defendant’s services).
53. See id. (describing services plaintiff and defendant offered).
54. See id. (explaining cross-elasticity occurs if, after competitor raises prices
for its good, consumer turns to substitute source to receive good).
55. See id. at 184 (bolstering holding by providing examples of circuit courts
that have held “advertisers and brokers of a good or service are not competitors of
companies that actually supply the good or service” (citing Bodie-Rickett & Assocs.
v. Mars, Inc., 957 F.2d 287, 290–91 (6th Cir. 1992) and S.D. Collectibles, Inc. v.
Plough, Inc., 952 F.2d 211, 213 (8th Cir. 1992))).
56. See Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 76–78 (3d
Cir. 2000) (comparing case’s facts to Barton & Pittinos’s facts and analyzing
whether plaintiff was competitor pursuant to test laid out in Barton & Pittinos),
overruled on other grounds by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654
F. 3d 462 (3d Cir.), as amended (Oct. 7, 2011).
57. See id. at 64–66 (describing traditional carpet distribution system and
plaintiff’s disruptive business model).
58. See id. at 64–65 (describing anticompetitive conduct that trade association
allegedly took to force plaintiff out of market).
59. See id.
9
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ble alternative to the defendants’.60  If wholesalers raised the price of their
product, consumers could turn to Carpet Group’s product as a substi-
tute.61  Thus, their products were cross-elastic, and they were consequently
competitors for purposes of Section 4 standing.62  Notably, although Car-
pet Group’s “competitor” analysis remains intact, the portion of the case
relating to the jurisdictional limits of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act was subsequently overruled.63
III. STEPPING UP THE REQUIREMENTS ON STANDING UNDER THE
CONSUMER-OR-COMPETITOR TEST: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S
DECISION IN ETHYPHARM
In Ethypharm, the Third Circuit once again addressed the delineation
of competitor when determining antitrust standing under the
consumer-or-competitor test.64  The court considered whether a manufac-
turer of a cholesterol drug had standing to bring suit for anticompetitive
conduct against a dual manufacturer and distributor of a similar drug.65
Although the court used the consumer-or-competitor test, it abandoned
the earlier definition of competitor articulated in Barton & Pittinos and
Carpet Group and instead adopted a much more restrictive definition that
focuses on a company’s distribution chain.66  In doing so, the Third Cir-
60. See id. at 77 (holding plaintiff “ ‘endeavored to forge a link in a chain of
the sale’ of oriental rugs between foreign rug manufacturers and domestic rug
retailers.  That link competed directly with the traditional middlemen—the rug
importer/wholesalers.” (quoting Crimpers Promotions Inc. v. Home Box Office,
724 F.2d 290 (2d Cir.1983))).
61. See id. at 77–78 (stating defendant’s rigorous attempts to abolish plaintiff’s
business was evidence consumers found their products to be substitutable).
62. See id. at 75–80 (holding plaintiff was competitor in relevant marketplace
and subsequently weighing other Associated General factors for standing).
63. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc., 654 F.3d 464, 467–68 (3d Cir.), as amended (Oct 7.
2011) (“We will now overturn this aspect of our. . . Carpet Group decision[ ] and
hold that the FTAIA constitutes a substantive merits limitation rather than a juris-
dictional limitation.”).
64. See Ethypharm S.A. Fr. v. Abbott Labs. (Ethypharm III), 707 F.3d 223,
232–37 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying consumer-or-competitor test to specific facts of
case).
65. See id. at 225–26.
66. See id. at 236 (noting distributor-manufacturer relationship and regulated
pharmaceutical industry and explaining its effects on plaintiff’s standing); see also
Editorial Board, 3rd Circuit: Foreign Drug Maker Lacks Antitrust Standing to Challenge
Actions Allegedly Taken Against Its U.S. Distributor, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE
(Feb. 4, 2013), http://blogs.orrick.com/antitrust/2013/02/04/3rd-circuit-rules-
that-foreign-drug-manufacturer-lacks-antitrust-standing-to-challenge-actions-alleg
edly-taken-against-its-u-s-distributor/ [http://perma.cc/2ALN-CJPN] (describing
general holding in Ethypharm); Barbara T. Sicalides & Deirdre E. McInerney, A
Cure for Antitrust Standing?, COMPETITION NEWS (Pepper Hamilton, Philadelphia,
Pa.), Mar. 7, 2013, at 7, 8, available at http://www.pepperlaw.com/resource/463/
23D3 [http://perma.cc/WK67-HX32] (discussing how Third Circuit’s decision
will impact “different levels of the distribution chain”); Molly Storey, Third Circuit:
A Drugmaker That Cannot Legally Compete in the US Lacks Antitrust Standing, WEIL
GOTSHAL (Apr. 1, 2013), http://antitrust.weil.com/articles/third-circuit-a-drug
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss4/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR402.txt unknown Seq: 11 30-NOV-15 15:48
2015] CASEBRIEF 713
cuit has further limited the number of companies who have standing
under Section 4 and thus stands in stark contrast to the federal circuits
that promote a broad approach to private antitrust standing.67
A. Setting the Scene on Standing: Facts and Background of Ethypharm
In Ethypharm, a French pharmaceutical company brought suit against
an American pharmaceutical company for allegedly violating federal anti-
trust laws.68  Ethypharm S.A. France (Ethypharm), the French corpora-
tion, was responsible for developing and manufacturing a fenofibrate
cholesterol drug called Antara.69  Instead of directly selling Antara to con-
sumers in the United States, Ethypharm sold the exclusive right to dis-
tribute Antara in the United States to Reliant Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(Reliant).70  Thus, Ethypharm was responsible for providing the finished
drug to Reliant, and Reliant was tasked with marketing and selling the
drug in the United States as well as procuring FDA (Food and Drug Ad-
ministration) approval.71
maker-that-cannot-legally-compete-in-the-us-lacks-antitrust-standing/ [http://
perma.cc/FMR7-MBWQ] (explaining that certain manufacturers who use distribu-
tors will not have Section 4 standing after Third Circuit’s decision).
67. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit’s decision in Ethypharm has nar-
rowed the meaning of a competitor in the consumer-or-competitor test, see infra
notes 83–91 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of federal circuits that have
adopted broader tests for antitrust standing, see supra notes 32–41 and accompany-
ing text.
68. See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d at 225.
69. Id. at 225–26 (explaining nature of Ethypharm corporation and develop-
ment of Antara).
70. See id. at 226–27 (explaining Ethypharm’s development of distribution
chain).  Due to the intensely regulated nature of the pharmaceutical industry,
product licensing is a highly common practice. See Patricia M. Danzon, Economics
of the Pharmaceutical Industry, NBER. REP., Fall 2006, available at http://www.nber.
org/reporter/fall06/fall06.pdf [http://perma.cc/4A6C-Q2TK] (discussing com-
mon practice of licensing in pharmaceutical industry).  As smaller research compa-
nies often do not have the resources necessary to capitalize on their products, they
will often license out their products’ rights to well-connected large pharmaceutical
companies. See id. at 14 (“Increasingly, new drugs originate in small firms, which
often out-license their products to more experienced firms for later-stage drug
development, regulatory review, and commercialization.”).
71. See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d at 226–27 (discussing license and distribution
agreement between Ethypharm and Reliant).  Ethypharm tasked Reliant with ob-
taining FDA approval because of the “substantial time and resources” it would take
to get the approval. See id. at 226 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The eco-
nomics of the pharmaceutical industry is unique in a variety of aspects, which en-
hances the need for strict regulation. See Danzon, supra note 70, at 14 (examining
price regulation in pharmaceutical industry).  For example, the pharmaceutical
industry is regulated because of the “uncertainty about drug safety and efficacy.”
Id.  Furthermore, prices are regulated due to the presence of partial inelasticity of
demand. See id. at 15 (explaining that it is insurance companies, not consumers,
who absorb burden of higher drug prices, and thus consumers are “insensitive” to
drug price increases).
11
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“Reliant sought FDA approval of Antara pursuant to [Section]
505(b)(2) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act [(FDCA)],” which is a
process intended for companies that have a “drug that is not entirely new
but is not simply a generic version of a branded drug.”72  By taking this
approval path, Reliant was able to cut costs by relying “on the data [and
results] of another, already approved, fenofibrate [cholesterol] drug,”
TriCor.73  After obtaining FDA approval, Reliant began to sell Antara, and
in 2005 alone, Antara sales had generated $23.5 million in profits for the
company.74  Then, “[i]n a prophylactic maneuver, Reliant filed a declara-
tory judgment action” requesting an avowal that Antara was not infringing
on TriCor’s patents.75  Abbott Laboratories (Abbott), a company holding
both the right to manufacture and distribute TriCor, “counterclaimed for
infringement” of two TriCor patents.76
Reliant and Abbott eventually settled the case, and their settlement
terms restricted Reliant from licensing Antara to certain “large pharma-
ceutical companies.”77  Reliant ultimately sold its license to a small phar-
72. See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d at 226, 227 (explaining how Reliant obtained
FDA approval).
Usually, obtaining FDA approval for a pharmaceutical product requires the
manufacturer to submit “detailed safety and efficacy data for the drug to the
FDA . . . .” Id. at 226.  However, under Section 505(b)(2), a manufacturer can
circumvent this costly submission if its drug is roughly similar to a branded drug
that has had its safety and efficacy data already submitted to the FDA. See id.  But if
a manufacturer takes this route, it must also allege whether its product infringes
on any other manufacturers drug patents. See id. at 227–28. Reliant chose this
option, but it failed to certify that Antara did not infringe any patents; thus, it
“exposed Reliant to a possible infringement suit.” Id. at 228.
73. See id. at 227 (explaining how Reliant received FDA approval for Antara).
TriCor, a fenofibrate cholesterol drug, was originally developed and manufactured
by the French corporation Laboratories Fournier; however, Laboratories Fournier
sold the right to manufacture and distribute TriCor to an American company, Ab-
bott Industries. See id.  Thus, although Ethypharm could not distribute its fe-
nofibrate drug in the United States, both Ethypharm and Abbott manufactured
fenofibrate cholesterol drugs. See id. at 227 & n.5 (explaining that Ethypharm
manufactured Antara and Abbott was “granted [ ] an exclusive license to manufac-
ture and sell TriCor”).
74. See id. at 228 (explaining Antara was able to successfully compete in the
market notwithstanding its legal troubles).
75. Id.
76. See id. (discussing Abbott’s patent infringement claims).
77. See id. at 228–29 (explaining terms of 2006 settlement).  Pursuant to the
settlement, Reliant received a license to the TriCor patents while Abbott received
royalty payments. See id. at 227–28.  The “Restricted Entity” provision of the settle-
ment agreement prohibited Reliant from selling “its rights in Antara . . . . [to]
about 20 large pharmaceutical companies [and] 10 generic companies.” See id. at
229 (internal quotation marks omitted).
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss4/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR402.txt unknown Seq: 13 30-NOV-15 15:48
2015] CASEBRIEF 715
maceutical company, Oscient.78  However, sales of Antara plummeted,
and Oscient filed for bankruptcy shortly thereafter.79
In 2009, troubled by Reliant’s failure to sell its product Antara in the
United States, the manufacturer, Ethypharm, brought suit against Abbott
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, claiming that Abbott and Reliant’s
settlement terms were anticompetitive and violated Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.80  The district court found that Ethypharm had
proper standing under Section 4 and held that a foreign manufacturer
who used a distributor to sell its product in the United States could use
“the antitrust laws . . . [to] challeng[e] the conduct of a manufacturer of a
competing brand name drug.”81  Relying on Barton & Pittinos and Carpet
Group’s definition of competitor, the district court surmised that if
TriCor’s prices rose, consumers would switch to Antara.82  Therefore,
there was cross-elasticity of demand, which made Ethypharm a competitor
and satisfied the consumer-or-competitor test.83  Nonetheless, the district
court granted summary judgment to Abbott on other grounds, and
Ethypharm subsequently appealed.84
78. See id. at 229–30 (explaining Oscient “did not appear on the Restricted
Entity list”).
79. See id. (discussing fate of Oscient).  Despite early competitive sales, Antara
quickly lost traction due to the appearance of “generic fenofibrate manufacturers.”
See id.
80. See id. at 230 (claiming agreement was anticompetitive because Abbott in-
tended settlement agreement to prevent Antara from competing with TriCor by
“mak[ing] sure that Antara would be put in the hands of a company with limited
resources” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
81. Ethypharm S.A. Fr. v. Abbott Labs. (Ethypharm I), 598 F. Supp. 2d 611, 616
(D. Del. 2009), disapproved in later appeal, 707 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2013).
In its standing analysis, the district court focused on the fact that Ethypharm
and Abbott were manufacturers of a drug that competed directly with each other.
See id. at 616.  By honing in on the similarity of Antara and TriCor, the court fore-
went a structural analysis of Ethypharm’s distribution process. See id. (“Ethypharm
does not forfeit the protection of the antitrust laws merely because it sought to
enter the U.S. fenofibrate market by utilizing the route of an exclusive distributor
rather than, for example . . . organizing its own U.S. marketing force.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).  Lastly, the court explained that Ethypharm had
proper standing because it had only licensed Antara to Reliant, and thus there was
no threat of “duplicative recovery.” See id. at 618.
82. See id. at 616–22 (comparing facts of case to those in Barton & Pittinos and
Carpet Group).
83. See id. at 617–24 (stating Antara and TriCor were reasonably interchange-
able drugs and holding that Ethypharm had standing because its injury was “inex-
tricably intertwined” with injury to market (internal quotation marks omitted)).
84. Ethypharm S.A. Fr. v. Abbott Labs. (Ethypharm II), 805 F. Supp. 2d 59, 67
(D. Del. 2011) (granting summary judgment for Abbott Industries because plain-
tiff failed to show nexus “between the [alleged] antitrust violation and actual dam-
age suffered [by Ethypharm]” (first alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)), rev’d in part, 707 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Ethypharm III,
707 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 2013) (providing background on Ethypharm’s appeal to
Third Circuit).
13
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B. No Standing to Sue: The Third Circuit’s Analysis in Ethypharm
The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s decision in part, holding
that Ethypharm was not a consumer or competitor in the pharmaceutical
market, and that the company consequently lacked standing to bring a
private antitrust claim against Abbott.85  In its analysis, the Third Circuit
analogized Ethypharm to the plaintiff in Barton & Pittinos and distin-
guished the facts from those in Carpet Group based on Ethypharm’s inabil-
ity to supply its product directly to consumers.86  The court pronounced
that a plaintiff was a competitor in the relevant marketplace if consumers
turned directly to the plaintiff for its product in response to a rise in the price
of the defendant’s product.87  According to the court, Ethypharm, much
like the plaintiffs in Barton & Pittinos, could not legally provide its choles-
terol drug to consumers in the United States: Ethypharm had to use a
third party—Reliant—to act as its distributor.88  Thus, the court held that
there was no cross-elasticity (and hence no direct competition) between
Ethypharm’s and Abbott’s products because even if Abbott raised TriCor’s
prices, consumers could only procure Antara indirectly from Reliant.89  In
so holding, the Third Circuit was adamant that its formulation of a com-
petitor was no different than it had been in Barton & Pittinos and Carpet
Group.90
Interestingly, the Third Circuit went on to state that it was not the
manufacturer-distributor relationship between Ethypharm and Reliant
that precluded standing, but rather Ethypharm’s legal inability to “sell
Antara in the United States.”91  The court noted the strict FDA regulations
85. See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d at 237 (“[W]e conclude that Ethypharm did not
suffer antitrust injury because it does not and indeed cannot compete in the
United States fenofibrate market . . . .  As a result, Ethypharm lacks antitrust stand-
ing to sue Abbott.”).
86. See id. at 233–35 (distinguishing facts of case from Carpet Group).  This
approach, which focused on a company’s distribution system, is markedly different
from the product-level approach that the district court took. Compare id., with
Ethypharm I, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 614–15 (focusing on whether Antara and TriCor
competed with one another in market).
87. See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d at 236 (stating Ethypharm was not a competitor
with Abbott because it could not “directly supply” fenofibrate products to Ameri-
can consumers).
88. See id. at 234–36 (stating that facts of Ethypharm most closely resembled
those in Barton & Pittinos).
89. See id.  This focus on a consumer turning directly to a company differs from
the test laid out in Carpet Group and Barton & Pittinos, both of which focused on
whether a consumer would turn to a certain product, not a company.  For an in-
depth discussion of this change and the effect that it has had on standing in the
Third Circuit, see infra notes 94–131 and accompanying text.
90. For a discussion of how the decision in Ethypharm III has essentially nar-
rowed the traditional definition of competitor, see infra notes 94–131 and accom-
panying text.
91. See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d at 234–36 (describing how Ethypharm forewent
obtaining FDA approval to sell Antara in United States and instead passed burden
onto Reliant).
14
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that precluded Ethypharm from directly entering the United States mar-
ket “differentiate[d] th[e] case from others in which a manufacturer
ha[d] a legal right to sell a good in the United States but cho[se] to utilize
an exclusive distributor” because, unlike those manufacturers, Ethypharm
was “literally not a lawful competitor.”92  Ultimately, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that a pharmaceutical manufacturer that fails to obtain FDA ap-
proval for its product cannot then benefit from United States antitrust
laws enacted to protect legal competitors; the antitrust acts do not allow a
company to  “pass on . . . the expense and risk of qualifying to compete in
the United States” while also taking advantage of the United States’ plain-
tiff-friendly competition laws.93
IV. ANALYZING ANTITRUST STANDING IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT:
ETHYPHARM’S IMPACT ON THE CONSUMER-OR-COMPETITOR TEST
In narrowing the meaning of competitor under the consumer-or-com-
petitor test in Ethypharm, the Third Circuit has effectively widened the cir-
cuit split that currently exists concerning antitrust standing.94  Because the
court’s definition of competitor focused on a manufacturer’s distribution
process, the decision will further limit the number of plaintiffs, especially
those in the pharmaceutical industry, who will have Section 4 antitrust
standing.95  The court’s stance stands in stark contrast to other circuits
that have interpreted Section 4 to provide consumers, competitors, and
many others a private right of action to obtain redress.96
A. Who Is a Competitor? Not Whom You Think, According to the
Third Circuit
Under the Third Circuit’s traditional definition, two companies were
competitors for antitrust purposes if their products were “reasonably inter-
changeable” with one another.97  In Ethypharm, the Third Circuit dis-
92. Id. at 236.
93. See id. at 236 (discussing impact of Ethypharm’s choice to forego ob-
taining FDA approval to sell its own product).
94. See generally SigmaPharm Cert. Petition, supra note 11, at 14 (describing
nature of circuit split that currently exists over antitrust standing and consumer-or-
competitor test); Fiala et al., supra note 11, at 1–2 (same).  For a discussion of how
the decision has specifically widened the circuit split, see infra notes 130–31 and
accompanying text.
95. See generally Floyd, supra note 8, at 6–7 (stating how consumer-or-competi-
tor test is restrictive and has resulted in “underdeterrence”).
96. See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text (discussing how various cir-
cuits treat standing under the Clayton Act).
97. See Barton & Pittinos, 118 F.3d at 182 (“In order to hold that [the plaintiff]
was in competition with the pharmacists, we would have to conclude that what [the
plaintiff] offered was reasonably interchangeable with what the pharmacists of-
fered.”).  The Third Circuit has used this formulation in a multitude of cases be-
sides Barton & Pittinos and Carpet Group. See, e.g., Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1998) (using traditional definition of com-
petitor); Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1991) (same);
15
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carded its traditional formulation of what constitutes a competitor in favor
of a significantly more restrictive definition.98  As compared to the court’s
previously more liberal requirements under the consumer-or-competitor
test, the new test articulated in Ethypharm will reduce private antitrust liti-
gation within the Third Circuit’s jurisdiction.99
Under this well-established meaning, Ethypharm and Abbott were un-
questionably competitors in the relevant marketplace.100  Ethypharm’s
product, Antara, was a fenofibrate cholesterol drug, which was reasonably
interchangeable with Abbott’s fenofibrate cholesterol drug, TriCor.101
Because consumers would likely switch from Abbott’s TriCor to
Ethypharm’s Antara if TriCor’s price rose, Abbott and Ethypharm were
competitors and Ethypharm had standing to sue under the Third Circuit’s
traditional analysis.102
The traditional definition of competitor does not take into account a
company’s distribution strategy.103  It is irrelevant that consumers did not
obtain Antara directly from Ethypharm under the established competitor
formulation; it only matters that consumers would ultimately buy Antara if
TriCor’s price rose.104  This understanding is analogous to a retail store
distribution strategy; the fact that a manufacturer’s goods are sold via re-
tailers such as CVS, for example, does not mean that the goods are no
Pa. Dental Ass’n v. Med. Serv. Ass’n of Pa., 745 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); see
also 1 MILES, supra note 51 (referencing all cases that have defined relevant prod-
uct market and cross-elasticity in terms of substitutability).  The Supreme Court
has also defined the terms competitor and relevant marketplace by comparing cross-
elasticity of products. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 394 (1956).
98. For a discussion of how the definition of competitor has been narrowed,
see infra notes 109–18 and accompanying text.
99. For a discussion of how the decision will affect the healthcare industry, see
infra notes 132–45 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 42–63 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit’s
adoption of consumer-or-competitor test and its subsequent case law defining
competitor).
101. See Ethypharm I, 598 F. Supp. 2d 611, 616 (D. Del. 2009) (noting that
Antara and TriCor were reasonably interchangeable), disapproved in later appeal,
707 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2013).  Antara and TriCor’s interchangeability was further
evidenced by the fact that Reliant was able to bypass mandated drug-efficacy inves-
tigations by relying on TriCor’s earlier investigations. See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d
223, 227 (3d Cir. 2013).  Furthermore, suspicions that Antara was infringing
TriCor’s patents highlighted the similarity of the drugs. See id.
102. See Ethypharm I, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (finding cross-elasticity of Antara
and TriCor sufficient to satisfy standing claim).
103. See id. at 618 (noting manufacturer does not “forfeit” antitrust standing
just by using distribution system instead of supplying its product directly to con-
sumers (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally 54 AM. JUR. 2D § 410
(2009) (noting manufacturers and wholesalers “generally have standing” under
Section 4).
104. See Ethypharm I, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 616–17 (noting consumers would
switch to Antara if TriCor’s price rose).
16
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longer the manufacturer’s product.105  Here, Abbott and Ethypharm both
manufactured fenofibrate cholesterol drugs, and although the two em-
ployed different distribution systems for their drugs, Antara was still
Ethypharm’s product, and thus it was interchangeable with Abbott’s prod-
uct TriCor.106  The Third Circuit’s traditional definition of competitor,
which the district court initially used, recognized that distribution meth-
ods are extraneous to determine whether two companies are compet-
ing.107  Thus, under the traditional test, Ethypharm would have had
Section 4 standing (provided the other McCready factors were met).108
In Ethypharm, however, the Third Circuit jettisoned its traditional for-
mulation and adopted a much more limited approach.109  Specifically, the
court narrowly defined the concept of cross-elasticity.110  Under the Third
Circuit’s new formulation of cross-elasticity, it is not enough that consum-
ers “turn to” product B if product A’s price increases.111  Instead, if prod-
105. See generally Distributing Your Product, ONTARIO MINISTRY AGRIC., FOOD &
RURAL AFFS., http://www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english/food/industry/food_proc_
guide_html/chapter_10.htm [http://perma.cc/7K8F-CZ57] (last modified Nov.
13, 2013) (discussing how companies can use wholesaler or distributor to sell their
products); Austin Grandt, Distributor vs. Reseller: What’s Right for Me?, EX-
PORTABROAD BLOG (Oct. 2, 2014), http://blog.exportabroad.com/distributor-vs-re
seller-whats-right-for-me/ [http://perma.cc/2ZV2-A35J] (explaining that when
manufacturers use distributors, distributor is involved with selling manufacturer’s
product); Entrepreneur Staff, Distribution Models, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www.en-
trepreneur.com/encyclopedia/distribution-models [http://perma.cc/6YWV-
78EX] (last visited Oct. 29, 2015) (describing varying types of distribution
models).
106. See Ethypharm I, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 615–17 (noting Antara was ultimately
Ethypharm’s product).
107. See id. at 617–20 (using traditional definition of competitor and ulti-
mately holding that Ethypharm had standing).
108. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (discussing district court’s
decision).
109. See supra note 99.
110. See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d 223, 236 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding Ethypharm
and Abbott did not compete against one another because Ethypharm did not dis-
tribute its own drug in United States); Sicalides & McInerney, supra note 66 (not-
ing Ethypharm narrows consumer-or-competitor test by focusing on distribution
chain); Storey, supra note 66 (noting impact of decision on manufacturers). Com-
pare Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d at 236  (holding competitor in relevant marketplace is
one where, if product A’s price rises, consumers will turn to company for product
B), with Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178,
182–83 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding competitor in marketplace is one where, if prod-
uct A’s price rises, consumers will turn to product B).  The Third Circuit has re-
fused to acknowledge the marked difference between these two tests.
See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d at 233–36 (noting its analysis is consistent with analysis
used in Barton & Pittinos).
111. See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d at 236; see also GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH—
PHARMACEUTICAL ANTITRUST 189 (Marleen Van Kerckhove ed., 7th ed. 2014), avail-
able at http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/7d9b61a1-1ab1-47d4-84a4-
7711db4e2188/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/29500be6-1fc5-4177-be7d-86
59f2e8535a/PH2014-United-States_05_09_14.pdf [http://perma.cc/9RW4-D7X4]
(describing traditional antitrust test and the emphasis placed on company’s prod-
17
Giordano: Taking a Stand on Standing: The Third Circuit Widens the Circuit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR402.txt unknown Seq: 18 30-NOV-15 15:48
720 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 703
uct A’s prices increase, product A’s consumers must directly turn to the
company producing product B.112  Put differently, in order to meet the
Third Circuit’s newly formulated competitor test, a company must now
not only manufacture its product, but also sell it directly to consumers.113
By inserting a “method-of-distribution” analysis into the cross-elasticity
standard, Ethypharm was no longer a competitor because it utilized a
third party to distribute its product to consumers.114
The Third Circuit attempted to distinguish Ethypharm from the
plaintiffs in prior cases based on its lack of a legal right to sell its drug in
the United States; this distinction, however, is incongruous with the new,
narrower consumer-or-competitor test the court set out.115  In dicta, the
court noted that it was not the manufacturer-distributor relationship that
barred standing; instead, it was “the fact that Ethypharm [could] not [le-
gally] sell Antara in the United States . . . .”116  But the court’s holding also
maintained that a company is a competitor only if the consumer directly
“turn[s] to” the company itself to obtain a substitute product.117  Thus, a
manufacturer, even if it had the legal right to sell its product in the United
States, would still fail the aforementioned test if it used a distributor to sell
its product.118  Because the Third Circuit failed to pronounce a test that
properly distinguished between the types of manufacturer-distributor rela-
tionships, the court has left many antitrust-competition questions
unanswered.119
ucts and the alternative products “customers could turn to in the face of an at-
tempted price increase”).
112. See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d at 236 (discussing how consumers could not
“turn to Ethypharm for Antara” if TriCor’s price rose).
113. See id. at 235 (stating “there is no cross-elasticity of demand between
Ethypharm’s offerings and Abbott’s offerings [because] . . . . customers in the
United States cannot purchase the drug at issue from Ethypharm”).
114. See id. at 236–37 (holding that because consumers could get TriCor di-
rectly from Abbott but could not get Antara directly from Ethypharm, Ethypharm
and Abbott were not competitors in marketplace).
115. See supra notes 83–113 (discussing consumer-or-competitor test outlined
by Third Circuit).  The test, which on its face mandates that a consumer turn to a
manufacturer for a product, does not distinguish between manufacturers that have
the ability to sell to consumers in the United States and those who do not. See id.
116. See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d at 236 (emphasizing fact that Ethypharm can-
not legally sell Antara in United States).
117. See id. at 236–37.
118. For example, if Ethypharm had FDA approval to sell Antara in the
United States but chose to license Antara’s distribution rights to Reliant, consum-
ers would still be “turn[ing] to” Reliant, not Ethypharm, for Antara.  Under the
Third Circuit’s newly formulated test, Ethypharm would still not qualify as compet-
itor in marketplace, and therefore, would not have standing. See id. at 235–36.
119. This uncertainty will continue to exist until the Third Circuit again ad-
dresses the issue, and manufacturers who have the legal right to sell their product
in the United States but choose to use a distributor will not know if they have
standing under the Clayton Act. See generally IIA PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTI-
TRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (3d ed.
2007) (discussing varying interpretations of Section 4 that have resulted in poten-
18
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B. The Third Circuit Tells Pharmaceutical Plaintiffs to Sit Down
The Third Circuit’s new, more restrictive version of the
consumer-or-competitor test will significantly limit the number of plain-
tiffs who can bring suit under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.120  Now, it
seems that manufacturers who use a traditional distribution model are not
competitors with manufacturers that sell their products directly to con-
sumers.121  This will have the largest impact in the pharmaceutical indus-
try, where licensing and distribution agreements are especially
prevalent.122  It is exceedingly common for small pharmaceutical compa-
nies and research facilities to develop and patent a new drug, yet lack the
capital and resources to properly distribute it.123  To work around this is-
sue, many of these small entities enter into distribution agreements with
larger pharmaceutical companies to market and sell their products.124  In
light of the Third Circuit’s new and limited application of the consumer-
or-competitor test, these small entities can no longer use Section 4 as a
sword and may find themselves as “[v]ictims [w]ithout [ ] [r]emed[y].”125
tial plaintiff’s lacking clarity concerning standing); Michael Puleo, Casebrief, Anti-
trust—Being a Player Against a Monopoly—How Plaintiffs Can Pass Go and Collect $200:
The Third Circuit’s Requirements for Consumer Standing Under Sections 4 and 16 of the
Clayton Act, 46 VILL. L. REV. 881, 890 (2001) (positing that there is no “black-letter
rule” to antitrust standing and examining history of antitrust standing and uncer-
tainty that it has engendered).
120. See Fiala et al., supra note 11 (noting that post-Ethypharm, manufacturers
of products who do not have right to sell in United States and do not sell their
product directly to consumers will lack antitrust standing in Third Circuit).
121. See id. (identifying new limitation of antitrust standing based on
Ethypharm).
122. See generally HEALTH STRATEGIES CONSULTANCY LLC, FOLLOW THE PILL:
UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. COMMERCIAL PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN 4 (2005),
available at http://www.avalerehealth.net/research/docs/Follow_the_Pill.pdf
[http://perma.cc/N9GT-7AYF] (describing role of manufacturer in pharmaceuti-
cal industry and stating that “[v]ery few drugs are distributed directly to consum-
ers”); INST. OF MED., COUNTERING THE PROBLEM OF FALSIFIED AND SUBSTANDARD
DRUGS 9 (Gillian J. Buckley & Lawrence O. Gostin eds., 2013), available at http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK202530/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK202530.pdf [http:
//perma.cc/769W-N32D](describing “complex” drug distribution chain that ex-
ists in United States).
123. See Jacob Serebrin, Big Pharma Turns to Smaller Firms for Innovation, GLOBE
& MAIL (June 24, 2013, 9:43 A.M.), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/small-business/sb-money/business-funding/big-pharma-turns-to-smaller-
firms-for-innovation/article12751137/ [http://perma.cc/9S7D-QMN5] (discuss-
ing small pharmaceutical companies that have been at forefront of developing new
drugs).
124. See John LaMattina, Does Pharma’s Emphasis on External Sourcing of Drugs
Represent a Strategic Shift Away from Internal Research?, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2014) http:/
/www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2014/03/11/does-pharmas-emphasis-on-
external-sourcing-of-drugs-represent-a-strategic-shift-away-from-internal-research/
[http://perma.cc/A28D-D6PG] (describing trend of big pharmaceutical compa-
nies entering into agreements with small pharmaceutical companies and academic
research institutions to obtain licenses of drug patents).
125. See Floyd, supra note 8, at 6–30, 66–70.  Competitors are often the ideal
candidates to bring antitrust violators to task because of the collective action prob-
19
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Because competitors are often the ideal candidates to enforce antitrust
laws, it is probable that the Third Circuit’s constricted view of what consti-
tutes a competitor will result in “underdeterrence” of anticompetitive
actions.126
The Third Circuit’s constriction of competitor is significant when
placed in the context of the recent increase in antitrust litigation.127  Un-
like most other industries, antitrust cases in the pharmaceutical industry
are rapidly on the rise.128  Additionally, because a vast number of pharma-
ceutical companies are located in New Jersey and Delaware, the Third Cir-
cuit has dealt with a large influx of these cases.129  Thus, it is notable that
the decision in Ethypharm, which will likely limit the number of potential
pharmaceutical antitrust plaintiffs, coincides with the dramatic increase of
healthcare antitrust cases in the Third Circuit.130  It seems probable that
the Third Circuit’s decision in Ethypharm was motivated by a desire to sig-
nificantly reduce the amount of pharmaceutical antitrust litigation.131
lem that consumers face. See id. at 6, 7–30, 60–70; id. at 6 (“Courts that restrict the
universe of potential plaintiffs to those who have felt the ultimate price and output
effects of the defendant’s anticompetitive scheme often screen out those plaintiffs
who were most directly and visibly harmed, who are most aware of their injuries,
and who have the greatest ability and incentive to sue.”).  In this case, Ethypharm,
as the entity who most acutely felt the ramifications of Abbott’s actions, was the
ideal candidate to challenge the legality of Abbott’s actions under the Sherman
and Clayton Acts. See Ethypharm I, 598 F. Supp. 2d 611, 618 (D. Del. 2009) (finding
Reliant had no reason to challenge anticompetitive nature of agreement because it
had received benefit of immunity as condition of infringement suit settlement, and
thus there was no risk of duplicative recovery), disapproved in later appeal, 707 F.3d
223 (3d Cir. 2013).
126. See Floyd, supra note 8, at 5–6.  By holding that Ethypharm did not have
standing to bring suit, the Third Circuit essentially immunized Abbott’s conduct
from review.  Dan Packel, Ethypharm Urges 3rd Circ. to Revive Abbott Antitrust Row,
LAW 360 (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.law360.com/articles/380633/ethypharm-
urges-3rd-circ-to-revive-abbott-antitrust-row [http://perma.cc/3A8L-7A89] (quot-
ing Ethypharm’s attorney, who stated, “If we don’t give Ethypharm standing . . . .
[t]he conclusion is that no other entity can bring an antitrust suit.” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
127. See Third Circuit Other Statutes Cases, JUSTIA, https://dockets.justia.com/
browse/circuit-3/noscat-13/nos-410 [http://perma.cc/7A93-Y967] (last visited
Oct. 29, 2015) (providing extensive list of antitrust cases in Third Circuit).
128. Morse, supra note 50, at 633 (“The pharmaceutical industry has become
a major target of antitrust investigations and litigation.”).
129. See Pharmaceuticals, N.J. BUS. ACTION CTR., http://www.nj.gov/njbusi-
ness/industry/pharmaceutical/ [http://perma.cc/JYQ2-SE48] (last visited Oct.
27, 2015) (noting New Jersey houses 14 of 22 biggest pharmaceutical companies).
130. See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated
sub nom. Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013); Animal
Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir.), as amended (Oct.
7, 2011); W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
131. The Third Circuit has been suspected of attempting to reduce pharma-
ceutical antitrust litigation by raising standing requirements in the past. See gener-
ally Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers
for Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437, 445 (2001) (“I believe that
20
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Ultimately, the Third Circuit’s decision has widened the current Sec-
tion 4 standing circuit split.132  Compared to the other federal circuits, the
Third Circuit now has the harshest, most defendant-friendly approach to
private antitrust standing.133
V. GET UP AND RUN: HOW PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS CAN
MAINTAIN STANDING IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Because pharmaceutical actions compose a large amount of the anti-
trust litigation brought each year, it is necessary for pharmaceutical practi-
tioners to be aware of whether their clients have standing to sustain a
Section 4 claim.134  With the recent developments in the Third Circuit
concerning antitrust standing, counsel should take Section 4 standing into
account when structuring their client’s supply chain agreements.135  Cur-
rently, if a manufacturer lacks the legal right to sell its product in the
United States and instead uses a distributor to sell its product, the manu-
facturer will also lack Section 4 standing because it is not selling its prod-
uct directly to consumers.136  If a manufacturer wants to maintain its
Section 4 standing in the Third Circuit, it should structure its distribution
model as a sole-agency agreement.137
Under agency law, an agent is considered to “act on the principal’s
behalf” and is viewed as an extension of the principal.138  Therefore, in an
agency relationship, an act by the agent is viewed as an act by the princi-
pal.139  Consequently, if a manufacturer uses an agency agreement instead
of a typical retailer distribution agreement, the manufacturer will be con-
the court’s cramped approach to antitrust injury was at least in part a reflection of
its desire to cut down on antitrust litigation.”).
132. Compare Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d 223, 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining
plaintiff must be consumer or competitor in market to have standing and further
narrowing definition of competitor), with Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d
302, 311 (4th Cir. 2007) (declining to follow consumer-or-competitor test).
133. See Mayhan, supra note 5, at 464–73 (explaining consumer-or-competitor
test is unduly restricting).  The Third Circuit has taken an already restrictive test
and limited it further by narrowing the definition of a competitor. See generally Jay
L. Himes, When Caught with Your Hand in the Cookie Jar . . . Argue Standing, 41
RUTGERS L.J. 187 (2009) (noting antitrust standing generally has been subject to
defendant-friendly interpretation by federal circuits).
134. See Morse, supra note 50, at 633 (noting healthcare antitrust cases are
increasing).
135. See Sicalides & McInerney, supra note 66 (identifying Ethypharm court’s
emphasis on party’s location within distribution chain).
136. See id. (discussing how manufacturers who cannot legally sell their prod-
uct in United States and use distributor will lack antitrust standing post-Ethypharm).
137. See generally Sales Agency Agreement, IMDA, http://www.imda.org/docu
ments/sales_agency_agreement.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z76Q-GEFS] (last visited
Oct. 29. 2015) (demonstrating agreement for sole agency distribution model).
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (defining agency
relationship).
139. See id. cmt. c (stating legal consequences of principal-agent relationship).
21
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sidered to be directly selling its products to consumers via its agents.140
Accordingly, if Reliant had been characterized as Ethypharm’s agent in-
stead of a third party distributor, Ethypharm would have met the Third
Circuit’s definition of competitor.141  Characterizing the supply chain as
an agency relationship is not a novel idea in antitrust law; on the contrary,
it has been wielded before to circumvent liability in other antitrust
matters.142
To successfully implement an agency relationship between pharma-
ceutical manufacturers and retailers, practitioners should structure the
contract as a “sole agency model.”143  These contracts are increasingly
used in Europe, and under these contracts, “the manufacturer [ ] sell[s]
directly to their customers with an exclusive wholesaler acting as a . . .
logistics service provider only.”144  To constitute this agency contract, a
practitioner must warrant that its client bears the brunt of the risk and
retains a high degree of control in effectuating the day-to-day business.145
By structuring the relationship this way, practitioners should be aware that
their manufacturer-clients will retain ownership of their product stock un-
til their retailer-agents pass it on to consumers.146  Ultimately, an agency
relationship should be incorporated into the supply chain if a manufac-
140. See id. (noting principals act through their agents).
141. See Ethypharm III, 707 F.3d 223, 236 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting Ethypharm
did not sell its product directly to consumers and hence was not a competitor).  If
Reliant had been Ethypharm’s agent, Ethypharm would have been viewed as sell-
ing products directly to consumers via its agent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (defining principal-agent relationship).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 481–88 (1926)
(holding manufacturer did not violate antitrust acts via “resale price” maintenance
because its retailers were its agents and not third-party distributors). But see United
States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 689–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing e-
book publisher’s attempt to structure its relationship with iBook as agency rela-
tionship did not save it from antitrust liability when relationship was facial conspir-
acy to fix prices). See generally Stephen Smith & Andrew Hobson, Agency or
Distribution? The Struggle for Mastery in E-book Pricing, LEXOLOGY (May 9, 2011),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=81389527-652e-4f27-8705-6028f88
f2999 [http://perma.cc/4PD5-H9E6] (discussing antitrust consequences that stem
from characterization of supply chain as agency or retail distribution model).
143. See Sales Agency Agreement, supra note 137 (demonstrating sample
agreement to create agency relationship).
144. See PANOS KANAVOS ET AL., THE PHARMACEUTICAL DISTRIBUTION CHAIN IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION: STRUCTURE AND IMPACT ON PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES 33
(2011), available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51051/1/Kanavos_pharmaceutical_dis
tribution_chain_2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/W73C-JLHR](noting increasing prev-
alence of agency relationships in European pharmaceutical industry); Supply Chain
Arrangements, ALLIANCE HEALTHCARE, http://www.alliance-healthcare.co.uk/useful-
information/agency-wholesaler-agreements/ [http://perma.cc/7YVV-6Y5P] (last
updated Oct. 29, 2015) (listing all pharmaceutical manufacturers that have agency
arrangements with retailers).
145. See Smith & Hobson, supra note 142 (discussing how company can struc-
ture its relationship as “genuine agency”).
146. See KANAVOS ET AL., supra note 144, at 33 (discussing consequences of
sole agency model).
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss4/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR402.txt unknown Seq: 23 30-NOV-15 15:48
2015] CASEBRIEF 725
turer wishes to use a distributor while maintaining Section 4 standing
under the Clayton Act.147
VI. CONSUMER-OR-COMPETITOR TEST STANDS STRONG AFTER ETHYPHARM
The Ethypharm opinion showcases the Third Circuit’s reluctance to
“open the gates” to private antitrust litigation.148  Instead, the court has
now inserted an additional restriction on standing that arbitrarily accounts
for a plaintiff’s position on the distribution chain.149  This restriction fur-
ther distances the Third Circuit from the Supreme Court’s expansive ap-
proach to standing in McCready.150  Ultimately, the Third Circuit’s strict
interpretation of Section 4 means that the circuit split will continue for the
foreseeable future.151  Until the Supreme Court again addresses standing,
the narrow consumer-or-competitor test will reign supreme in the Third
Circuit.152
147. See id. (detailing structure of sole agency agreement in pharmaceutical
industry).
148. See Fiala et al., supra note 11 (asserting decision in Ethypharm has “rein-
forced” Third Circuit’s consumer-or-competitor stance on antitrust standing).
149. See supra notes 109–18 and accompanying text (discussing Ethypharm’s
impact on distribution chain).
150. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text (discussing McCready’s
broad interpretation of standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act).
151. See, e.g., SigmaPharm Cert. Petition, supra note 11, at 14 (stating circuit
split exists with regards to both antitrust standing and use of consumer-or-competi-
tor test).
152. The last notable standing issue the Supreme Court addressed concerned
who qualifies as a consumer in their relevant market. See generally Kansas v.
UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990) (denying standing to a plaintiff
deemed to be “indirect purchaser”).
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